Saturday, June 21, 2008

When the smoke cleared in the Arghandab valley

GRAEME SMITH

From Saturday's Globe and Mail

June 21, 2008 at 12:17 AM EDT

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MANARA, AFGHANISTAN — A stench of death wafted up from piles of bodies, festering in the summer heat of the Arghandab valley. Afghan soldiers held cloths over their faces, pointed to a charred blast site nearby, and described the corpses as the bombed remnants of an invading Taliban force much larger than the Canadian military has estimated.

Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid brought a group of local journalists, and one foreign reporter, to the heaped carnage in the village of Manara, about 10 kilometres north of Kandahar city, as part of a broader struggle to define the week of chaos in this province.

After days of responding to emergencies, first to a Taliban raid that freed hundreds of prisoners from a city jail on June 13, and then a short-lived sweep by armed insurgents into a dozen villages north of the city, top officials finally had a moment of relative quiet to reflect on what happened – and to argue over their wildly differing interpretations.

All authorities agree that the Taliban have abandoned Arghandab district in the past two days. But there is major disagreement about the size of the Taliban force that infiltrated this strategic swath of farmland, why they invaded, and what, if anything, they achieved.

Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, the senior Canadian commander in Kandahar, met Friday with French, U.S. and Canadian officers in charge of marshalling hundreds of Afghan forces into regular patrols of the district in coming days, as they search for roadside bombs and try to ensure the villages are safe enough for residents to go home.

The Afghan government continues to warn thousands of villagers they should stay away from the north side of the Arghandab River, although NATO issued a statement on Thursday saying the region is secure enough for their return.

“They're gone,” Gen. Thompson said, referring to the Taliban, as he waved his hand across a map of the district.

A French officer, sitting on a canvas cot in the shade of a troop carrier, gave the Canadian commander a puzzled look. “But why did they come?” he asked.

“What you have to understand about this district is it's all one tribe, the Alokozai,” Gen. Thompson said. “They're mostly pro-government. So this was the Taliban demonstrating to the tribe that they're vulnerable. It was a psychological operation, not a military operation.”

Afghan officials have described the incursion differently, saying it was a genuine – if misguided – attempt by the insurgents to threaten the provincial capital. Kandahar is the former seat of government for the Taliban, and the governor said he believes the insurgents overreached in the giddy aftermath of their successful jailbreak.

The heart of the Canadian-Afghan disagreement lies with estimates of insurgent numbers.

Gen. Thompson says no more than 100 to 150 insurgents got into Arghandab, while Mr. Khalid says they had roughly 600.

At a meeting inside Arghandab's fortified district administration buildings, the two leaders exchanged good-natured gibes. Mr. Khalid pointed to an Afghan army officer wearing a floppy sun hat, his face covered in sweat, and said the field commander had just informed him that about 200 Taliban had been killed in the recent fighting.

“Why is NATO saying only a few Taliban were there?” Mr. Khalid said.

Getting no answer, the governor pressed his point. He took a mobile phone from an assistant and showed its screen to the Canadian commander: “Look, we have photos,” he said.

The Canadian laughed. “One, two,” he said, pointing to the small screen. “That's not 200.”

Gen. Thompson tried to steer the conversation toward the need for Afghan police to take over security in the district, saying Kandahar has many other urgent priorities for Canadian troops. But the governor seemed intent on making his point, and within an hour he had summoned several journalists to join a vehicle convoy into the heart of the former battlefield.

A video monitor in the dashboard of Mr. Khalid's sport utility vehicle said the outside temperature was 41 degrees, but inside the cool interior of his luxury vehicle the governor seemed relaxed and philosophical.

Like other Afghan officials, he emphasized the role of foreign fighters in Kandahar's insurgency. The dead in Arghandab included many “Pakoolis,” he said, suggesting that sightings of insurgents wearing the flat-topped woolen pakool cap indicates a large contingent of Taliban came across the border from Pakistan's frontier region, where that style of headgear is more common among Pashtun tribesmen. Tajiks from northern Afghanistan also wear the same caps, but they play a minor role in the largely Pashtun insurgency.

He also suggested that last week's jailbreak was far too sophisticated to be planned by local insurgents.

“They were very smart, and it was a great victory for the Taliban,” Mr. Khalid said. “But I know the Taliban in this province, and they are not so smart.”

Rebuilding started Friday on the Sarpoza prison's destroyed outer wall, a Canadian official said last night, and a temporary structure is expected to be ready within five days. A permanent new gate is planned to upgrade the facility's defences, among other improvements.

Roaring to a halt near the village of Manara, the governor led a parade of visitors on a dusty hike along an irrigation ditch to a place where the trees were darkened with soot and nearby walls had crumbled.

At this spot, Mr. Khalid said, the insurgents had rushed to help a wounded Taliban commander named Mullah Shakoor. The concentration of insurgents was tracked by the foreign troops using aerial reconnaissance, he said, and they were hit by a large bomb.

So many bodies lay jumbled around the blast site, mangled and covered with flies, that it was difficult to count them. Afghan soldiers nearby estimated that perhaps 17 to 19 insurgents had died in the impact of a 225-kilogram bomb.

Mr. Khalid said the commander was among those killed, but an insurgent spokesman said Mr. Shakoor remains alive.

None of the dead insurgents were wearing pakools or gave any other sign of being foreigners.

After conferring with Afghan soldiers near the site, Mr. Khalid revised his estimate of the Taliban dead to 105.

The Afghan Defence Ministry put the death toll at 56, and NATO has not released a figure.

Mr. Khalid also pointed to green plastic containers buried at an intersection nearby, one of many explosive booby traps the Taliban installed before leaving. Soldiers had marked the roadside bombs with red spray paint.

Booming noises rang through the valley later in the day, as foreign troops removed such traps by blowing them up.

Back at the district centre, Gen. Thompson smiled grimly when informed about the dead bodies at Manara.

“Nineteen still isn't 200,” he said.

Would help protect pipeline, Canada says

SHAWN MCCARTHY

From Friday's Globe and Mail

June 20, 2008 at 4:57 AM EDT

OTTAWA — Canadian Forces would support the Afghan National Army in providing security for a proposed natural gas pipeline through war-torn Kandahar if the Afghanistan government asks for help, federal officials said yesterday.

But the Canadian government has not been involved in any planning for the project, including the potential need to protect the pipeline from insurgent attacks, officials added.

Afghanistan agreed this spring with three neighbouring countries - gas-rich Turkmenistan and energy-hungry Pakistan and India - to construct a $7.6-billion (U.S.) natural gas pipeline to connect those markets by traversing the most violence-prone regions of the country.

In a report released yesterday, international energy economist John Foster said the pipeline could require Canada's assistance in providing security, particularly as Afghanistan has vowed to clear the route of land mines and insurgents before the proposed construction start date of 2010.

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The United States is strongly backing the so-called TAPI pipeline, both to provide economic development in Afghanistan and as part of a broader energy-related geopolitical strategy. The Americans are eager to see the project proceed to prevent Iran from supplying Pakistan and India with gas through a rival project, and to reduce Russia's influence in the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan.

Mr. Foster said Canada risks being drawn - wittingly or not - into that "new great game" in which its forces are used to guard strategic energy infrastructure. He added, however, that the pipeline is unlikely to be built as long as the Taliban continued to battle NATO and Afghan forces in Kandahar and other southern provinces.

Federal officials said yesterday that Ottawa has played no role in planning the project, though Canada has endorsed the country's official development plan, which promotes both the gas pipeline and an aggressive effort to build power facilities in the country to provide rural electricity.

A senior defence official suggested that it is unlikely Canadian troops would be involved directly in providing security for the pipeline, but would support Afghan efforts to do so.

"We are supporting the [Afghan National Army], and if it becomes one of their priorities, then we'll support them in that priority," Colonel Gerry Champagne said during a briefing yesterday.

Another senior government official - who spoke on the condition he not be identified - said Canada broadly supports the Afghan effort to build a legitimate and stable economy, including projects like the TAPI pipeline. But Canada has not been promoting the pipeline as part of a broader geopolitical agenda, as the Americans have, he said.

Liberal Senator Colin Kenny - chairman of the Senate's national security and defence committee - said Canada has similar interests in the global energy market as the United States, and should not shy away from supporting U.S. geopolitical objectives. "I don't think we would be serving Canadian interests if we were ignoring American interests," he said.

Liberal defence critic Bryon Wilfert said the pipeline represents a welcome signal of co-operation between the participants - especially traditional rivals Pakistan and India - but will require a co-ordinated approach to security. He noted the British have supported the construction of a dam in Helmand province to provide electricity, and that facility has been the target of Taliban attacks.

"From an economic standpoint, it certainly would be very positive in terms of its construction, but with that, it's going to become a magnet for those who would want to stop progress and, of course, we know the Taliban have attacked similar projects," he said.

"So it's good news, but it means security is going to be even more of an issue."

Pipeline opens new front in Afghan war

Canadian role in Kandahar may heat up as allies agree on U.S.-backed energy route through land-mine zones and Taliban hot spots

SHAWN MCCARTHY

From Thursday's Globe and Mail

June 19, 2008 at 2:30 AM EDT

OTTAWA — Afghanistan and three of its neighbouring countries have agreed to build a $7.6-billion (U.S.) pipeline that would deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to energy-starved Pakistan and India – a project running right through the volatile Kandahar province – raising questions about what role Canadian Forces may play in defending the project.

To prepare for proposed construction in 2010, the Afghan government has reportedly given assurances it will clear the route of land mines, and make the path free of Taliban influence.

In a report to be released Thursday, energy economist John Foster says the pipeline is part of a wider struggle by the United States to counter the influence of Russia and Iran over energy trade in the region.

The so-called Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline has strong support from Washington because the U.S. government is eager to block a competing pipeline that would bring gas to Pakistan and India from Iran.

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The TAPI pipeline would also diminish Russia's dominance of Central Asian energy exports.

Mr. Foster said the Canadian government has long ignored the broader geopolitical aspects of the Afghanistan deployment, even as NATO forces, including Canadian troops, could be called upon to defend the critical energy infrastructure.

“Government efforts to convince Canadians to stay in Afghanistan have been enormous,” he says in a report prepared for the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, a left-of-centre think tank in Ottawa.

“But the impact of the proposed multibillion-dollar pipeline in areas of Afghanistan under Canadian purview has never been seriously debated.”

In an interview, Mr. Foster – a former economist with Petro-Canada, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank – said he believes the TAPI project could provide major benefits for Afghanistan and the region generally. If the project proceeds – and serious obstacles remain – Afghanistan's national government could reap $160-million (U.S.) a year in transit fees, an amount equivalent to half the government's current revenue.

But he said the security issues remain daunting and the Canadian military could – wittingly or not – become embroiled in a “new great game” over energy security that is playing out in the region.

Acting Foreign Affairs Minister David Emerson – who chairs the cabinet committee on Afghanistan – would not comment on the pipeline yesterday. When asked about the project earlier this spring, he said only that Canada wants to see Afghanistan develop a “legitimate and legal economy that can sustain a credible, viable state.”

Backed by the opposition Liberals, the Conservative government has committed to keeping the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan until 2011, although there is growing skepticism that the engagement will end at that point.

New Democratic Party MP Paul Dewar said the government needs to be more forthcoming about the four-nation project and whether Canadian forces would end up guarding the pipeline.

Though experts remain skeptical that the project will get off the ground, the four countries appear determined to prove them wrong.

With the backing of Manila-based Asian Development Bank, ministers from the four countries met in late April and agreed to start construction of the pipeline by 2010, and begin supplying gas by 2015, although critical financial issues must still be worked out.

At a donor's conference attended by a Canadian delegation last November, countries committed to “assist Afghanistan to become an energy bridge in the region” and to accelerate work on the TAPI pipeline “to develop a technically and commercially viable project.”

There was no public discussion of who would provide the security for the project.

The pipeline proposal goes back to the 1990s, when the Taliban government held talks with California-based Unocal Corp. – and its U.S. government backer – while considering a competing bid by Argentina's Bridas Corp. Those U.S.-Taliban talks broke down in August, 2001. India, which desperately needs natural gas imports to fuel its growth, later joined the revived project.

Last week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher said the U.S. government has a “fundamental strategic interest” in Afghanistan that goes well beyond ensuring it is not used as a launching pad for terrorism, which was the original justification for the UN-sanctioned NATO mission of which Canada is a part.

That objective remains paramount, Mr. Boucher said, but he added that there is a “historic opportunity … of having an open Afghanistan that can act as a conduit for energy, ideas, people, trade, goods from Central Asia and other places down to the Arabian Sea.”

Stephen Blank, a professor at the U.S. Army War College, in Carlisle Barracks, Pa., said the U.S. government is particularly eager to provide an alternative to the proposed $7.5-billion (U.S.) Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, which those three countries have agreed to pursue.

“From the U.S. viewpoint, the idea of blocking Iran is of paramount significance,” he said.

As well, the United States is pushing the TAPI pipeline as one of several natural gas export options from Central Asia that would bypass Russia, which until now has maintained a stranglehold on gas exports from the region.

But Dr. Blank – who has written extensively on energy-related geopolitics in the region – said he doesn't believe the TAPI pipeline will be built any time soon due to security concerns.

Still, the project is seen as a key part of Afghanistan's strategic development plan, which Canada and its NATO partners have endorsed as critical to establishing its political stability.

Monday, June 16, 2008

Afghanistan: Paris Donor Conference Should Prioritize Human Rights

Urgent Need to Address Women’s Rights, Freedom of Expression, Impunity

(New York, June 10, 2008) – The Afghan government and international donors should place human rights at the center of discussions at the June 12 donors’ conference in Paris, Human Rights Watch said in a public letter today.

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Human Rights Watch identified women’s rights, freedom of expression, impunity, transitional justice, judicial reform, and abolition of the death penalty as among the key issues in Afghanistan requiring serious attention and reform.


“The Paris conference will take place at a time when the Afghan government is increasingly unpopular because of abuses, corruption and lack of security,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “If the donors just offer more of the same and ignore the need for systemic reform, including a commitment to take on warlords and address impunity, then the situation in Afghanistan is likely to deteriorate.”


In the past six years, cooperation between the Afghan government and international donors, such as the United States and the European Union, has spurred positive developments, such as significant increases in primary school enrollment rates and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections. However, amidst an ongoing civil war, Afghanistan remains mired in insecurity, poverty, widespread human rights abuses, and impunity, since the government does not prosecute perpetrators of abuses who have protection from government officials, parliamentarians or warlords. Much more investment and work are required before the international community fulfills the multiple commitments it has made to assist Afghanistan to achieve sustainable development, local and regional security, and respect for human rights.

In preparation for the Paris meeting, Afghan and international groups and interested individuals developed a series of thoughtful recommendations on human rights, which they submitted to the Afghan government and donors. Human Rights Watch urged participants at the Paris conference to take these recommendations very seriously as they develop plans and policies.

“It is critical that Afghan civil society is treated as an integral and indispensable partner in Afghanistan’s reconstruction,” said Adams. “We urge the government and donor countries to ensure the full and genuine participation of Afghan civil society, including the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, in high-level policy meetings and deliberations.”

Open Letter from Human Rights Watch to the International Afghanistan Support Conference on June 12, 2008

June 10, 2008

Dear Delegates:

As you meet in Paris to assess the Afghan government’s progress towards benchmarks set by the 2006 Afghanistan Compact and launch the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), Human Rights Watch urges you to place human rights at the center of discussions with the government of Afghanistan and your development strategies.

In the past six years, cooperation between the Afghan government and international donors has spurred positive developments, such as significant increases in primary school enrollment rates and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections. However, in the midst of a ongoing civil war, Afghanistan remains mired in insecurity, poverty, widespread human rights abuses, and impunity. Much more investment and work remains before the international community fulfills the multiple commitments it has made to assist Afghanistan to achieve sustainable development, local and regional security, and respect for human rights.

Most Afghans continue to live in an insecure environment where many of their basic rights remain unfulfilled. Because of a lack of security, in many parts of the country just going to the market, walking to school, or driving to work remains a very dangerous activity. Much of this is because of violence and threats from anti-government forces, particularly the Taliban, but responsibility also lies with warlords, drug lords, and others allied to the Afghan government. Human Rights Watch has long called for more international security forces to create a more secure environment for Afghans to enjoy their basic rights. While there has been a substantial increase in the past year, these forces have been slow in arriving and there are still significant gaps in their presence around the country.

Human Rights Watch calls on the Paris meeting to ensure that the concept of “security” takes into account how violence or the fear of violence impacts the lives of Afghans. Benchmarks should include, for instance, whether clinics and schools can operate, whether people can travel safely, and whether humanitarian agencies can carry out development and reconstruction projects. It is also important to ensure that all international security forces operating in Afghanistan facilitate security for reconstruction and development.

In preparation for the Paris meeting, Afghan and international groups and individuals developed a series of recommendations, which they have submitted to you. We urge you to take these very seriously as you develop your plans and policies. It is critical that Afghan civil society is treated as an integral and indispensable partner in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. We urge the government and donor countries to ensure the full and genuine participation of Afghan civil society, including the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, in high-level policy meetings and deliberations.

Human Rights Watch urges the Afghan government and donors to consider the following actions when prioritizing funding and initiatives for Afghanistan:

1. Women’s Rights

Despite gains in girls’ primary school enrollment rates and women’s political participation, Afghan women and girls confront discrimination in almost every aspect of their lives. They continue to struggle to exercise fundamental rights to health, education, work, freedom from violence, and freedom of movement. Afghan women and girls continue to rank among the world’s worst-off by most indicators, such as life expectancy (43 years), maternal mortality (1,600 deaths per 100,000 births), and literacy (12.6 percent of females 15 and older).

Afghanistan is likely to fall significantly short of achieving benchmarks set out in the UN Millennium Development Goals, which among other things aims to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education and to reduce the number of maternal deaths by 75 percent.

Donor countries should ensure that their support for the Afghan government is conditioned on improved integration of women in government and decision-making. Budgets should be designed to promote gender equality at all levels, with specific and sufficient funds earmarked for initiatives aimed at improving women and girls’ status. Donors should incorporate a gender perspective into evaluations of all funded projects.

Education
Girls’ and women’s education is absolutely essential to Afghanistan’s future and is both a critical and symbolic measure of Afghanistan’s progress. With 1.7 million girls currently in primary school, this is the highest number in Afghan history and a major milestone for the country. However, girls’ enrollment in lower and higher secondary schools drops off considerably, with less than 270,000 girls enrolled. Instead of improving, girls’ secondary schooling rates are beginning to regress from the initial spike in 2001.

Low literacy rates make education for girls an urgent priority in itself, but also have grave consequences on every other aspect of development in Afghanistan. Progress in areas such as health, political participation, and employment hinge on educating a new generation of female teachers, health care providers, and other workers.

Afghan women and girls continue to face formidable obstacles to education, such as the lack and distance of schools, government policies that give preferential support to boys’ schooling, lack of qualified teachers, sexual harassment while en route to school, and early marriage. In southern and eastern Afghanistan, insecurity, including targeted attacks against schools, teachers, and students have severely hampered both girls’ and boys’ ability to attend school.

Human Rights Watch urges donors and the government of Afghanistan to:

- Make access to education a benchmark for measuring compliance with the Compact, which sets out security as one of the three pillars of activity for the next five years.

- Closely monitor and increase enrollment and retention rates of girls and women at all levels of educations, especially at secondary and higher education levels.

- Devise and implement a strategy to monitor, prevent, and respond to attacks on schools, teachers, and students.

- Build more girls’ secondary schools and in the meantime expand existing primary schools to include secondary classes.

- Avoid creating a parallel system of home-based education and integrate girls into the formal education system.

- Consult local women and girls on locations of new schools to ensure that they are accessible. Work with communities to develop secure routes, methods of transportation, and community protection plans for school girls, especially older girls who may be at higher risk of harassment.

- Review school curricula for discriminatory content and develop curricula that teaches about human rights, including women’s and children’s rights.

Health
In a country where a high proportion of the population suffers from malnutrition and preventable disease, women and girls are particularly at risk due to their low social status and their limited access to health facilities. An area requiring particular attention is reproductive health. The ability to control matters related to reproduction and sexuality is fundamental to the exercise of Afghan women’s human rights.

Human Rights Watch urges donors to support the Afghan government to:

- Improve the quality and increase women’s access to the government’s Basic Package of Health Service (BPHS).

- Increase investment in training of practitioners specialized in women’s health care. Work toward ensuring that skilled attendance is available at all births by an accredited and competent health care provider who has at her or his disposal the necessary equipment and the support of a functioning health system.

- Support the establishment of a referral system between different levels of health care, in particular to handle life-threatening complications in pregnancy and childbirth.

- Increase resources for and effective implementation of the National Reproductive Health Strategy, placing particular emphasis on reduction of fertility rates and health education.

Gender Based Violence
Violence against women and the absence of effective redress for victims, whether through informal or formal justice mechanisms, is a pervasive human rights problem in Afghanistan. The practice of exchanging girls and young women to settle feuds or to repay debts continues, as do high rates of early and forced marriage. According to a study by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and women’s organizations, approximately 57 percent of girls get married before the age of 16. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), women’s activists, and nongovernmental organizations point to domestic violence being a widespread problem for which there is still little public awareness, prevention effort, or response. Local commanders and their forces have also been implicated in cases of sexual violence against women and girls.

The security and judicial sectors lack an institutional culture that is sensitive to women. Women and girls face many barriers to assistance, including police and local-level officials who dismiss or ignore their complaints, discriminatory divorce laws, and a lack of services, such as shelters, counseling, and legal aid.

Human Rights Watch urges donors to support the government of Afghanistan to act with due diligence to prevent violence against women; to monitor and investigate such violence; to prosecute and punish perpetrators, whether they are state or non-state actors; and to provide access to redress for victims, including by:

- Developing Family Response Units, comprising of male and female officers trained to handle gender-based violence, in each district police office.

- Enacting gender-specific legislation, including a family law and an anti- violence against women law. Provide training for judges and prosecutors in these laws.

- Funding comprehensive and coordinated support services for victims of violence, including shelter, legal aid, counseling, and access to health care.

- Developing national campaigns to raise awareness about women’s rights, gender-based violence, and harmful practices including early and forced marriage and honor-related crimes.

- Assessing budgets at national and local levels from a gender perspective to ensure a more equitable allocation of resources to eliminating discrimination and violence against women.

2. Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression for those who criticize government officials, the insurgents, or powerful local figures remains limited. Threats, violence, and intimidation are regularly used to silence opposition politicians, critical journalists, and civil society activists speaking out on issues of public concern. The culture of fear has been heightened by high-profile cases like that of Sayed Parviz Kambakhsh, a student sentenced to death on blasphemy charges for downloading an article he denies writing.

The Afghan media, which was once seen as a rare success of the post-Taliban government, has increasingly come under attack from warlords, insurgents, parliamentarians, and members of the government. This often leads to self-censorship, not just by journalists but by members of civil society and the public. Many journalists have been detained, some have been held without charge for days, weeks, or months. Violent attacks on independent media and journalists have increased since 2005. Just last week, on June 8, the bullet-ridden body of 25-year-old journalist Abdul Samad Rohani, a BBC correspondent, was found a day after he went missing in Helmand province. His death highlights the extreme dangers that journalists face in the south and east of the country where the armed conflict – and the resulting propaganda war – is most fierce. Insurgent groups have used murder, arson, and intimidation to try to stop reporting they see as unsympathetic. In some districts no independent media exists. Information black holes will continue to grow unless action is taken to reverse this trend.

Violence against journalists is by no means confined to the conflict areas; death threats are a common response to critical reporting anywhere in the country. Many journalists admit that some subjects have become taboo, in particular the drugs trade and high-level government corruption. Freedom of expression is also being threatened by the offer of bribes for sympathetic reporting from warlords and government officials.

When media workers have been murdered or attacked, the response of the security forces has been very limited, leaving journalists feeling more vulnerable. It has been over a year since the outspoken journalist and human rights defender Zakia Zaki was killed. No one has been charged with her murder.

Human Rights Watch is also concerned about the increasingly authoritarian response of the government towards the media. The government has attempted to bring criminal charges against journalists for having contact with insurgent groups. Numerous acts of governmental repression have been documented by Afghan media watchdogs. The recent attempt by the Ministry of Information and Culture to ban five entertainment programs on the grounds that they are “un-Islamic” has been perceived by most in the media industry as a politically motivated attempt to increase government control.

Lack of access to government information continues to severely hamper the already limited investigative journalism work in Afghanistan. Foreign military forces in Afghanistan have also been responsible for routinely obstructing journalists’ right to information.

Human Rights Watch has called upon the Afghan parliament and the executive to revise the draft media law to strengthen and protect an independent media in Afghanistan, rather than roll back freedoms. The Media Complaints Commission should be used by government officials at all levels to resolve problems with journalists and media outlets before resorting to the courts or, as in the case of Parwiz Kambakhsh, criminalizing speech and handing down the death penalty. Kambakhsh’s case demonstrates how fragile freedom of expression is in many parts of Afghanistan, and the lack of progress that has been made in establishing a professional and independent judiciary. It is an embarrassment to the Karzai government, which has failed to take judicial reform seriously, thereby failing to ensure respect for many basic freedoms.

3. Impunity, Transitional Justice, and Needed Judicial Reform

Impunity for serious human rights violations remains the norm, as the government does not prosecute perpetrators of abuses who have protection from government officials, parliamentarians, or warlords. This has a profound impact on public attitudes about the government.

While the government is formally committed to addressing crimes of the past, little action has been taken to implement the Transitional Justice Action Plan. A major step backwards was taken with the passage of the 2007 Amnesty Law which, though still in legal limbo, could make impunity the law of the land.

Afghans want justice for the crimes of the past. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) completed an extensive survey in 2004, based on in-depth interviews and focus groups, addressing issues of justice and accountability for past abuses. The survey makes it clear that the vast majority of Afghans want the past to be confronted, do not see such efforts as destabilizing, and want justice sooner rather than later.

According to the AIHRC survey results, 94 percent of Afghans consider justice for past crimes to be either “very important” (75.9 percent) or “important” (18.5 percent). When asked what the effects would be for Afghanistan in bringing war criminals to justice, 76 percent said it would “increase stability and bring security,” and only 7.6 percent said it would “decrease stability and threaten security.” Almost half of those questioned said war criminals should be brought to justice “now,” and another 25 percent said perpetrators should be tried “within two years.”

Human Rights Watch, along with numerous other international and Afghan non-governmental organizations, has repeatedly called on Afghan officials and international actors involved in Afghanistan to help create mechanisms to hold persons responsible for major human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed during Afghanistan’s wars. We fully agree with the AIHRC on the need for this issue to receive more attention. We support their view that the president and government of Afghanistan should better prioritize justice for victims of past abuses and fully endorse efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.

Human Rights Watch, therefore, urges the government to accelerate efforts to create justice-seeking mechanisms to sideline past abusers from political power and official positions and hold them accountable for their crimes. We urge the government to embrace justice and accountability as vital for the rule of law and the protection of human rights now and in the future.

We also urge the government, with the active support of donors, to accelerate reforms to the judicial system of Afghanistan, which are essential to successful justice-seeking efforts. The appointment of properly trained and independently minded judges and prosecutors, who owe no allegiance to factional leaders or regional strongmen, is crucial. The president should take a leadership role in creating the conditions necessary for genuine judicial independence, chiefly by ensuring that government officials do not interfere in individual cases before the courts. The government and its donors must also prioritize efforts to create a well-educated legal profession.

Some will argue that pursuing justice for past crimes will create political instability, as many human rights abusers and potential defendants remain in power at both the national and regional levels.

We believe this threat is consistently overstated. There is always a risk in seeking justice against powerful individuals for the human rights abuses they commit. With the support of the international community and civil society, justice-seeking processes have been undertaken in similarly fragile post-conflict settings. And as noted above, the AIHRC survey has indicated that three in four Afghans believe that achieving justice for past crimes would increase stability, not decrease it.

Renewed respect for human rights and the rule of law can help to create sustainable stability in Afghanistan. A serious and successful accountability process is a key means towards this goal.

By contrast, one of the biggest threats to Afghanistan’s political stability and future comes from individuals who have committed serious human rights abuses in the past. These are the people who are today most likely to resort to force and other extra-legal measures to circumvent and subvert Afghanistan’s political process and legal system. To achieve long-term stability, the government will ultimately have to address the continuing threat from these individuals.

We have long recommended that the government implement a set of vetting processes for government officials. The president, provincial governors, and other public officials should not appoint to public office individuals who have had credible allegations made against them about the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law or crimes against humanity. Appointed officials already in office who have had credible allegations made against them should be suspended or dismissed, depending on the credibility of the allegations and the gravity of the crime. Civil servants and civil service applicants should be screened to reject applicants who have had credible allegations made against them about the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law or crimes against humanity.

In future election periods, Afghanistan’s Electoral Commission should be empowered to hold public hearings at which allegations can be brought against candidates about their past serious human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, and crimes against humanity, as well as violations of the electoral law and candidates legal qualifications (Under 2005 election arrangements, the Electoral Commission worked in cooperation with a UN component to hear complaints about candidates, but only about allegations of violations of the electoral law and candidates’ legal qualifications). The AIHRC should be empowered to present evidence and bring complaints before the Electoral Commission on behalf of victims and survivors of past abuses. Persons alleged to have committed abuses should be given an opportunity to rebut charges and submit evidence. Parliament should formulate legislation defining the work of the Electoral Commission and the terms of its mandate.

To address crimes committed under international and domestic law during the armed conflicts in Afghanistan since 1978, the government should establish a Special Court, empowered to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious human rights crimes. Because the Afghan criminal justice system is currently incapable of investigating and prosecuting complex international crimes, and because of practical difficulties in guaranteeing that such a court would be impartial if domestically administered, the Special Court should be a mixed court comprised of both Afghan and international judges and prosecutors. To guard against political manipulation by powerful individuals who may be targets of criminal investigations, the court should have a majority of international judges and a prosecutor’s office led by an international prosecutor. The government should work with the parliament to address legal and constitutional issues arising from its creation. If necessary, the government should seek to amend the Afghan Constitution to address these issues.

The Special Court should be empowered to prosecute individuals on the basis of Afghan law in effect at the time of the offence as well as applicable international law, including international humanitarian law, international law regarding crimes against humanity, and other relevant international criminal law. The Special Court must be independent and impartial and meet international fair trial standards. It should include an effective protection program for victims and witnesses and their families. Due to domestic sensitivities and the deep social stigma associated with sexual violence in Afghanistan, the Special Court should create secure mechanisms for women and girls so that they can safely present evidence on sexual abuses.

The creation of a Special Court should be coordinated with broader efforts to improve and expand the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and to ensure compliance with international due process standards.

The government should grant no amnesties or other immunities to persons implicated in war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other serious violations of international human rights law. There must be no exceptions for government officials.

To address any future crimes of this magnitude and to bring Afghanistan into conformity with its treaty obligations, the government should implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ratified by Afghanistan in 2003. The president should propose legislation to parliament that would criminalize, under Afghan law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other serious violations of human rights. The president should work with parliament to enact additional legislation as required by the Rome Statute.

The president should appoint a standing panel of high-level and independent Afghan and international experts to propose and help implement additional programs and policies to address issues that are not dealt with by the Special Court. This should include an archive for the historical documentation of past abuses, recommendations on appropriate restitution or compensation mechanisms, and undertaking educational initiatives, such as the drafting of fair historical accounts in school textbooks.

International actors and donors should offer political, technical, and financial support to efforts to establish accountability mechanisms in Afghanistan, as discussed above. International actors should take into account public opinion in Afghanistan in formulating policies about past crimes and accountability mechanisms. Other countries should fully cooperate with investigations into past abuses, including by allowing access to documents and other materials held outside Afghanistan.

4. Death Penalty

Human Rights Watch is concerned about recent executions and the threat of execution of approximately 100 prisoners on death row in Afghanistan. The current judiciary system does not have the capacity to provide for fair trials or meet other death penalty standards as required under international law.

Human Rights Watch urges President Karzai not to sign execution orders for prisoners sentenced to death and instead use his presidential powers to commute all outstanding death sentences in Afghanistan.

Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as an inherently cruel and irrevocable form of punishment. Until such time as the death penalty is abolished in Afghanistan, we call on donor countries to support the introduction of a moratorium on the death penalty, drawing on the positive experience of other countries in transition that have done so. President Karzai should immediately announce a moratorium in Afghanistan.

5. Status of US forces in Afghanistan, Access to Detainees

Afghan civil society organizations have repeatedly called for a clarification of the status of the international military presence in Afghanistan through a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). While the deployment of the NATO-led international Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is mandated by the UN, the US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) operates in a legal vacuum. This has created significant problems regarding the detention of individuals in extra-legal facilities, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, lack of accountability for deaths and injuries to civilians, and inadequate compensation schemes for persons harmed by US forces. It is critical for the United States to bring its counter-terror operations into conformity with international law by making public all places of detention, releasing the names of detainees, and granting access to lawyers and human rights monitors, including the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. As required by international humanitarian law during armed conflicts not between states, persons apprehended should, at a minimum, be informed of the specific reasons for their arrest and be brought before an independent judicial body.

***

We thank you for your consideration of the above issues. We believe that if the government of Afghanistan and donors want to succeed in efforts to build state institutions accountable to the people of Afghanistan, intensified efforts have to be undertaken to increase the accountability and transparency of the government and donors to the people of Afghanistan. To this end the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Body (JCMB), which comprises the Afghan government and international donors, should integrate stronger benchmarks for accountability and transparency into the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and into the review process of the JCMB. In the past, human rights issues, such as the reform of the weak judicial system and the dysfunctional police force, have too often been postponed or entirely dropped from the agenda of the JCMB.

Yours sincerely,
Brad Adams
Executive director
Asia division

Sunday, June 15, 2008

AFGHANISTAN: Over 3.5 million at” high risk” of food insecurity - ministry



Photo: Abdullah Shaheen/IRIN

Food has gone beyond the reach of about one million
vulnerable Afghans only in the past five months due
to high food prices and drought, government officials said

KABUL, 12 June 2008 (IRIN) - High food prices and drought have driven over one million vulnerable people across Afghanistan into “high-risk” food-insecurity in the past five months, increasing the total number of “most vulnerable people” to over 3.5 million, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), told IRIN.

A joint vulnerability assessment conducted by UN agencies and Afghan governmental bodies in December 2007 identified 2.55 million Afghans (out of a total population of some 26 million) as being in need of an emergency “safety net” and severely affected by high food prices.

Since January, food has become unaffordable for thousands of vulnerable households. Afghanistan was ranked the fifth least developed country in the world in 2007.

“We estimate that now over 3.5 million people are seriously food-insecure and in need of a safety net,” said Saduddin Safi, head of the department of food-security at the MAIL.

“High prices, drought and conflict are three major causes of the worsening food-insecurity,” Safi said.

Governors issue warning

Meanwhile, the governors of four northeastern provinces affected by drought - Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan - have warned about a possible “humanitarian catastrophe” if the food needs of their people are unmet.
The governors, who met on 10 June in Kunduz Province, said tens of thousands of poor households in their provinces were increasingly facing food-insecurity mostly due to drought and rising prices.
The Afghan government and aid agencies are currently working to assess the magnitude of the food crisis, and launch a
new aid appeal to assist most affected households.

Aid distribution

In January the UN World Food Programme (WFP) agreed to distribute 88,000 tonnes of mixed food aid (wheat, pulses, iodised salt and vegetable oil) for 2.55 million highly food-insecure Afghans until June 2008.
According to The
Joint Appeal for the Humanitarian Consequences of the Rise in Food Prices every eligible household should receive 240kg of mixed food aid in three distribution rounds.


Photo:
Abdullah Shaheen/IRIN

WFP says its willing to adjust beneficiary selection
criteria provided that donors approve such a change

However, only about 31 percent (28,000 tonnes) of the planned aid has been distributed so far. Afghan officials are suggesting WFP change its modes of distribution to better help those affected.
“Instead of food aid given to one family in three rounds we propose that these families be assisted in one go,” Safi said, adding that such a change would also cover households pushed into extreme vulnerability after the aid appeal of January 2008.


In at least one instance distribution had been cancelled because people had been frustrated after seeing aid go to some but not others, he said.

“Needs are high and so are expectations… The number of needy people has risen sharply in the past six months and this complicates aid distribution [where it is] only to those who were surveyed and identified last year,” said Safi.
WFP representative Rick Corsino said it may be possible to adjust beneficiary selection criteria: “WFP is willing to consider somewhat revised criteria, providing they can be justified and substantiated, and that the contributing donors also agree.”

Debate over modes of aid distribution

MAIL’s Safi said it would make more sense in cases of free distribution for the 240kg of aid to be distributed in one go, rather than in three rounds. “This would reduce logistical and operational costs and ensure beneficiaries have uninterrupted access to aid,” he said.

Fewer distributions could also reduce security risks: In the past 18 months 40 WFP-contracted food trucks have been attacked, resulting in the loss of 1,000 tonnes of food.

WFP’s Corsino, however, pointed to logistical problems: “This is not practical as the food arrives in Afghanistan progressively over a number of months. We believe it is better to give all intended beneficiaries some of the allocation as quickly as possible, rather than giving some [people] all of their allocation at the start, and giving others all of their allocation [only] months later when the last shipments arrive.”

A big proportion of emergency food aid is planned to take place within food-for-work projects, WFP said. Free distribution is also part of the programme, but only to the most vulnerable families, such as households headed by women or the disabled.