Falling short: Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan

Source: Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

Date: 25 Mar 2008

Executive summary

Increasing insecurity and criminality is jeopardising progress in Afghanistan. With low government revenues, international assistance constitutes around 90% of all public expenditure in the country, thus how it is spent has an enormous impact on the lives of almost all Afghans and will determine the success of reconstruction and development. Given the links between development and security, the effectiveness of aid also has a major impact on peace and stability in the country. Yet thus far aid has been insufficient and in many cases wasteful or ineffective. There is therefore no time to lose: donors must take urgent steps to increase and improve their assistance to Afghanistan.

Reconstruction assistance is a fraction of military spending. Since 2001 the United States has appropriated $127 billion for the war in Afghanistan and the US military is currently spending nearly $100 million a day in the country, some $36 billion a year. Yet the average volume of international aid provided by all donors since 2001 is woefully inadequate at just $7 million per day. This paucity of aid is reflected in comparative aid per capita figures. In the two years following international intervention, Afghanistan received $57 per capita, whilst Bosnia and East Timor received $679 and $233 per capita respectively.

Since 2001 some $25 billion has been spent on security-related assistance to Afghanistan, such as building Afghan security forces. Donors have committed to spend the same amount on reconstruction and development, yet some leading donors have failed to fulfil little more than half of their aid commitments. Thus, there is an aid shortfall of some $10 billion – equivalent to thirty times the annual national education budget. Just $15 billion in aid has so far been spent, of which it is estimated a staggering 40% has returned to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries.

In absolute terms, the US is by far the largest donor, contributing one-third of all aid since 2001. Other major donors are: Japan, the UK, the European Commission (EC), the World Bank (WB), Germany and Canada; the relative contributions of The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden also are substantial. France and Spain, however, have made scant bilateral contributions since 2001 of just $80 million and $26 million.

Although a number of donors have major projects underway, according to Afghan government figures, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and India have disbursed only a third of their commitments for 2002-2008. The US has to date disbursed only half of its $10.4 billion commitment for this period; and the WB just over half its $1.6 billion commitment. The EC and Germany have disbursed less than twothirds of their respective commitments of $1.7 billion and $1.2 billion. These shortfalls are partly attributable to challenging operating conditions, high levels of corruption and weak absorption capacities – and government data may not capture all donor spending. However, the magnitude of the shortfalls underscores the importance of donors increasing efforts to mitigate or adapt to such problems, to factor them in to programme planning, and to improve the flow of information to the Afghan government.

Separately, a number of donors are not on track to fulfil their aid pledges for 2002-2011. Overall, $39 billion has been pledged up to 2011; but, so far, less than 40% of that amount has been spent. According to Afghan government figures, Spain has disbursed only 10% of the aid it has pledged for 2002- 2011, and the US and India have disbursed only 22% of their respective pledges of $22.8 billion and $940 million. Turkey, China, the ADB and WB and Saudi Arabia have all so far delivered less than 40% of their aid pledges for this period.

Much has been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001: there has been the establishment of democratic institutions and ministries, significant improvements in health care and immunization, the major expansion of primary education, the construction of roads and transport infrastructure, economic growth, and the formation of state security forces. There are many cases of well-delivered aid, for example in the education sector or in community-based rural development projects that are part of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), which have made a significant difference to Afghan lives.

However, most Afghans still endure conditions of hardship and millions live in extreme poverty. Far too much aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities – rather than responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences. Too many projects are designed to deliver rapid, visible results, rather than to achieve sustainable poverty reduction or capacity-building objectives. One quarter of all aid to Afghanistan has been allocated to technical assistance – which is intended to build government capacity – yet much of such assistance has been wasteful, donor-driven and of limited impact. In the design or execution of projects, too often the promotion of the capabilities, status and rights of women is an afterthought or perfunctory consideration. Most aid has been directed to Kabul or other urban centres, rather than to rural areas where it is most needed and more than three-quarters of Afghans live. At a macro level, areas such as agriculture have been under-resourced due to a lack of prioritisation.

Whilst there are undoubtedly resource constraints in Afghanistan, donors have fallen short on pledges made under the Afghanistan Compact to use more Afghan human and material resources. Over half of all aid to Afghanistan is tied, by which donors often require procurement of services or resources from their own countries.

NGOs have a vital role in supporting rural development and are comparatively cost effective. Yet some donors have reduced funding for Afghan and international NGOs, which has limited their ability to support the delivery of essential services, especially in rural areas, and to build the capacities of communities and local government.

There are significant disparities in the geographical distribution of aid. This is due to a range of factors, but not least because aid is being used to achieve military or political objectives. A number of major donors direct a disproportionate share of their funds to the southern provinces where the insurgency is strongest; if it were a state, Helmand alone would be the world's fifth largest recipient of funds from USAID, the US Agency for International Development. These disparities are also reflected in the pattern of combined government and donor spending: for 2007-2008 the most insecure provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, Zabul, Kandahar and Uruzgan have been allocated more than $200 per person, whereas as many other provinces are due to receive less than half this amount, and some, such as Sari Pul or Takhar, are allocated less than one third.

Given the links between poverty and insecurity, the resentment which these significant disparities has generated, and the perverse incentives created for secure areas, which perceive that insecurity attracts aid, this approach is dangerously short-sighted and has contributed to the spread of insecurity.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have gone well beyond their interim, security-focused mandate, engaging in substantial development work of variable quality and impact. Although arguably necessary in some highly insecure areas, by diverting resources which otherwise could have been devoted to civilian development activities, PRTs have in many cases undermined the emergence of effective institutions of national and local government, and other civil development processes. PRTs have also contributed to a blurring of the distinction between the military and aid agencies, which has thus undermined the perceived neutrality of the latter, increasing the risk for aid workers, and reduced humanitarian operating space and access.

Some two-thirds of foreign assistance bypasses the Afghan government, which undermines efforts to build effective state institutions, especially at sub-national level. This is partly attributable to problems in– which the Afghan government and donors over the past six years should have done more to address. It is of great concern that there appears to be a lack of political will to tackle high level corruption. Nevertheless, there has been an incremental increase in government capacity, for example, in the ministries of Finance and Education, and in improved public financial management systems.

Donors are failing to coordinate between themselves or with the government. According to an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) survey, in 2005 little or none of the technical assistance provided by the ADB, EC, Germany, Japan and the UK was through coordinated programmes consistent with the government's strategy, and just one-third of donor analytical work was undertaken jointly. Largely due to lack of donor coordination and communication, the Afghan government says it does not have information on how one-third of all assistance since 2001 was spent – some $5 billion. A large proportion of assistance is not in alignment with national and provincial plans, and only half is disbursed in agreement with the Afghan government.

Donors are failing to fulfil their commitment under the Afghanistan Compact to ensure taxpayers receive value for money. Vast sums of aid are lost in corporate profits of contractors and sub-contractors, which can be as high as 50% on a single contract. Minimal transparency in procurement and tendering processes stifles competition and efficiency. A vast amount of aid is absorbed by high salaries, with generous allowances, and other costs of expatriates working for consulting firms and contractors – each of whom costs $250,000–$500,000 a year; and with the recent deterioration in security such costs are increasing. Efficiency is further impaired by excessive donor bureaucracy.

There is limited donor transparency, and few mechanisms to hold donors accountable, or for effective scrutiny, monitoring and evaluation. The Afghanistan Compact has 77 measurable benchmarks for the Afghan government, but none for donors. Donors are subject to little independent scrutiny; reporting to the Afghan government has improved but is insufficient; and downward accountability to project beneficiaries is limited or non-existent.

Conclusions and recommendations

The impact of assistance to Afghanistan is heavily affected by the wider social, economic, legal, security and political environment; thus, reforms are required in many spheres in order to maximise aid effectiveness. Aid has made a significant difference to Afghan lives, but major weaknesses have severely constrained its capacity to reduce poverty. Thus, donors and the Afghan government should urgently adopt the following recommendations.

Volume of aid In conjunction with steps to enhance its effectiveness, donors should increase the volume of development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, which is a fraction of military assistance. Donors should seek to allocate more funds to the Afghan government (covered below) and to effective NGOs, fulfil aid promises, and provide more multi-year aid commitments. To avoid aid dependency, the government must strengthen efforts to increase domestic revenue.

Distribution of aid There needs to be a comprehensive and objective assessment of the reconstruction, development and humanitarian needs of Afghanistan's provinces, and a corresponding reconfiguration of government and donor spending. Whilst insecurity undoubtedly increases the costs of delivering assistance, there needs to be a more equitable distribution of resources and a high level of support for areas with greater development and humanitarian needs.

Quality of aid Donors should ensure their aid programmes have the primary or ultimate objective of reducing poverty, and that they are demand-driven, address needs as identified by Afghans, build local capacity, and are accountable to Afghan citizens and government. More aid must be directed to projects that benefit people living in rural areas, and gender equality objectives should be a primary consideration in the design and implementation of all development activities. Each donor should institute an annual aid review to measure its performance in each of these respects, and to assess consistency with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The revised ANDS and other donor–Afghan government development plans should incorporate prioritisation and sequencing, according to the comparative importance and magnitude of poverty reduction objectives.

Indicators of aid effectiveness Donors and the Afghan government should collectively agree on indicators of aid effectiveness, with correlative targets, measuring the impact, efficiency, relevance, sustainability, accountability, and Afghan ownership of aid, as well as the use of Afghan human and material resources.

Monitoring and accountability A national, independent commission for aid effectiveness should be established to monitor aid practices, identify deficiencies and make recommendations. The commission could issue an annual 'report card' for each donor, highlighting levels of achievement in respect of the proposed targets. Measures should be taken to strengthen downward accountability to citizens. Donors should provide funding for civil society organisations to carry out monitoring of aid flows and budget processes, which helps to ensure sustainable scrutiny of aid effectiveness.

Transparency Donors should publicly provide full information on aid flows; the Afghanistan Donor Assistance Database should be overhauled, updated and allow full public access to aid information.

Ownership and governance To maximise Afghan ownership of the development process, donors should seek to increase incrementally the level of aid provided to the government sector and to increase the volume of funds channelled to the core budget, especially the development budget component. To justify this, the Afghan government should take steps to:

- Improve budget execution capabilities, particularly implementing capacities of line ministries;

- Strengthen financial management and fiscal controls;

- Expedite public administration reform, especially in the civil service;

- Ensure rigorous implementation of the government's anti-corruption strategy; enhance transparency; improve monitoring, oversight and audit; and streamline government processes and procedures; and

- Reform sub-national governance, de-concentrate centralised line ministries; build institutional and systems capacities at local level; and expand the participation of communities and civil society in designing, implementing, directing and monitoring development activities.

Coordination and alignment Donors should use existing mechanisms to improve donor-government coordination; the human and financial resources of both the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and UN should be strengthened for this purpose. Donors should provide the government with timely, comprehensive and accurate information on all aid flows, and ensure they are consistent with national and local development priorities, above all, the ANDS.

Donors should substantially increase support for sectoral programmes, through mechanisms such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and thereby exceed the Paris Declaration target of 66% of aid delivered through such programmes. Donors should also increase the proportion of joint analytical work from one-third to two-thirds and ensure that at least half of donor missions are undertaken jointly.

Procedures Donors should simplify and harmonise bureaucratic processes and procedures for project management; they should establish a working group for this purpose, with Afghan government and NGO representation.

Technical assistance Donors should ensure that technical assistance (TA) is cost-effective, demanddriven, coordinated, aligned with national priorities, and focused on capacity building national staff. Pooled funds should be established by donors to oversee the provision of TA to specific ministries.

Contractors Donors should only use contractors who have a record of efficiency, and avoid multiple layers of sub-contracting. They should agree common rules or principles for contracting and tendering.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRTs must enhance the quality and impact of their assistance, ensure it is aligned with official national or local priorities and coordinate fully with state institutions. They should adhere to their mandate to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment, and, in line with their interim status, they should be downscaled, with closure plans for those in comparatively secure areas. Donor funds should be re-routed from PRTs to local and national government, such as through the NSP.

THE FACTS ON AID TO AFGHANISTAN

- There is an aid shortfall of $10bn – equivalent to thirty times the annual national education budget: donors committed to give $25bn aid since 2001 but have only delivered $15bn.

- An estimated 40% of aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries – some 6bn since 2001.

- Largely due to lack of coordination and communication, the Afghan government does not know how one-third of all aid since 2001 – some $5bn – has been spent.

- The US military spends close to $100m a day in Afghanistan; yet the average volume of aid spent by all donors since 2001 is just $7m per day.

- Over half of aid is tied, requiring the procurement of donor-country goods and services.

- Over two-thirds of all aid bypasses the Afghan government.

- According to the latest OECD figures less than 40% of technical assistance is coordinated with the government and only one-third of donor analytical or assessment work is conducted jointly.

- Profit margins on reconstruction contracts for international and Afghan contractor companies are often 20% and can be as high as 50%.

- Most full time, expatriate consultants, working in private consulting companies, cost $250,000– $500,000 a year.

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Afghan opposition courts Taliban

Battling: Police captured a Taliban
fighter in Shajoy, Afghanistan, on
March 22. Violence peaked last
year, with 6,000 civilians and
militants killed.
Goran Tomasevic/Reuters

Talks began in 2007, a powerful coalition revealed last week. Experts say the move, an effort to undercut the government, could draw Taliban into the political process.

By Anand Gopal Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

from the April 3, 2008 edition

Kabul, Afghanistan - The country's most powerful opposition group announced last week that they have been engaging in peace talks with the Taliban. The move signals both the growing divisions within the Afghan government and the increasing possibility that elements of the insurgent group could be drawn into the political process, say analysts.

If successful, officials argue that the talks will change the way the United States deals with Afghanistan, by forcing Washington to contend with the opposition.

Representatives of the United National Front – an assemblage of ministers, members of parliament, and warlords led by former Northern Alliance commanders – say they have held secret talks with the Taliban for at least five months.

"Leaders of some Taliban sections contacted us," says Front spokesman Sayyid Agha Hussein Fazel Sancharaki, "saying, 'We are both Muslims, we are both Afghans, and we are both not satisfied with the government's performance.' "

The government, which has had a series of secret talks with the "moderate Taliban" since 2003, has in contrast taken a different approach to negotiations. It insists that the Taliban must first surrender completely – disavow armed insurrection and accept the foreign presence.

But some observers say this strategy is too stringent and will not produce fruitful talks. "Why are they negotiating with Taliban who aren't fighting?" former Taliban official turned political analyst Wahid Muzjda asks. "The problem is with those who are fighting the government, and yet the government refuses to speak to this group."

Loosening the rules for talks

Mr. Sancharaki notes that his party will be more flexible in negotiations. "The Karzai government is using peace negotiations for political gain," he says, referring to President Hamid Karzai. "They will only talk to the Taliban if they lay down their weapons. This is impossible. But the National Front will have an agenda and a clear program for talks."

Perhaps to avoid being outmaneuvered by the opposition, Mr. Karzai's office responded by stating that both houses of parliament can negotiate directly with the insurgent group. The response marked a shift from previous policy in which Karzai tightly controlled the negotiation process.

The announcements come at a time when the government and the Taliban are feeling increased pressure to come to the table.

Last year marked the bloodiest year of the insurgency yet – the United Nations reports that Taliban attacks and NATO reprisals killed more than 6,000 people, including at least 1,200 civilians. The nation also saw more than 130 suicide attacks in 2007, and 10 percent of the country is under Taliban control, according to a recent US intelligence estimate.

Using Taliban to angle for power

As frustration with the poor security conditions has chipped away at the government's support, analysts say that the Front is announcing the talks now in order to increase pressure on Karzai.

"[They] are trying to use the Taliban to enhance their leverage vis-à-vis Karzai, to force him to make concessions in terms of ministerial posts and other appointments," says Antonio Giustozzi, a research fellow at the London School of Economics.

As Karzai's foreign and domestic support slips, the Front hopes to use its new status as Taliban interlocutor to win international backing.

"The people of this country are turning against the international community because of the record of the Karzai government and the security situation," says Sancharaki. "The international community should look to the National Front as a partner in bringing about peace and stability in Afghanistan."

The Front formed last year when former Mujahideen commander and president Burhanuddin Rabbani organized other strongmen and former Northern Alliance commanders in opposition to Karzai.

While the Front claims the support of 40 percent of members of parliament and scores of other influential figures, it still has difficulty shaking a checkered past.

Human rights groups allege that the commanders were behind many atrocities during the civil wars of the mid-'90s, and sections of the population consider the commanders nothing more than warlords.

Talks with the Taliban increase the strength and prestige of the Front and further isolate Karzai, says Mr. Muzjda. "This is an election year," the political analyst says, referring to the spring 2009 presidential elections. "They are trying to bolster their popularity and show that they are committed to peace."

Regardless of their intentions, experts say that recent declarations of negotiations help draw the Taliban into the political process and convince all sides that a powersharing agreement is possible in the future.

"All these talks have the net effect of legitimizing the Taliban and weakening the rationale for foreign presence in Afghanistan," Mr. Giustozzi says.

While most expect the insurgency to continue for several years, the Taliban is facing increasing pressure to open dialogue – despite losses inflicted upon NATO and its Afghan allies, the insurgents have not been able to defeat the coalition in most conventional battles.

Shared antipathy for Karzai

Although the core leadership is likely to resist peace talks, observers say that some Taliban commanders might be drawn to the Front due to shared antipathy for Karzai and to the opposition group's more flexible negotiation approach.

A recent Taliban statement openly called for coordination with the Front. "There is no doubt that the former ... commanders of Jihad have given a lot of sacrifices for Islam and for the path of freeing the country," the statement said, referring to Front leaders. "Now, it is necessary that they .. sacrifice once again against this invasion."

Yet ongoing deliberations in the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania – where members are debating troop commitments in Afghanistan – are convincing some insurgents to eschew negotiations and continue battling until all foreign soldiers leave the country, Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi says in a phone interview.

Document - Afghanistan: Women human rights defenders continue to struggle for women's rights

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIC STATEMENT

AI Index: ASA 11/003/2008 (Public)

Date: 07 March 2008

Afghanistan:

Women human rights defenders continue to struggle for women's rights

On 8^th March, International Women's Day Amnesty International expresses support for the human rights of women in Afghanistan in general, and in particular for women human rights defenders in Afghanistan. Their struggles for rights are an essential part of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural development of their country. But in promoting their rights, women frequently encounter discriminatory laws, policies and practices as well as attacks on them as women and as women who are defending human rights. Amnesty International calls on the government of Afghanistan and its international partners to reaffirm their commitment to protect the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan in accordance with international human rights law and standards.

Access to education, in conditions of safety and security, is essential for realising the human rights of girls. In Afghanistan, many girls and women still live under daily threat for attending a school or teaching in one. Their courage in the face of terrible odds is a reminder that the struggle for the right to education is being fought daily in many communities in Afghanistan.

In regions of conflict and insecurity, many women are afraid to leave their homes and send their girls to schools. They have little freedom of movement, limiting their ability to go to work and participate in public life. The fear generated by attacks on schools by the Taleban and other armed groups is undermining the right to education of tens of thousands of children, particularly girls. Over the last year more than 350 schools were reportedly closed in the southern provinces of Afghanistan.

Women continue to be killed in attacks which target civilians by armed groups or indiscriminate attacks by all parties to the conflict. They have also been specifically targeted for attack in many instances by the Taleban and other armed groups and individuals. Aid and health workers, election officials and candidates have all been targeted and some have been killed.

In September 2006, Safiye Amajan, the Director of the Women's Affairs department in Kandahar, was shot dead as she left her home for work. Last year, Zakia Zami, a woman who owned a radio station and was known to be vocal against warlords, was shot dead while sleeping aside her two young sons. Six people have been arrested in connection with her murder, but as in the case of Safiye Amajan, no one has so far been brought to trial.

While Amnesty International welcomes the progress in advancing women's rights since the fall of the Taleban, notably through the establishment of the Ministry for Women's affairs, the National Action Plan for women, improved access to education and representation of women in parliament, Afghan women and girls still face widespread discrimination from all segments of society, domestic violence, abduction and rape by armed individuals, trafficking, forced marriages, including ever younger child marriages, and being traded in settlement of disputes and debts.

Women are also at risk of physical abuse in their own homes. Husbands, brothers and fathers remain the main perpetrators of violence in the home but the power that they exercise is reinforced by both state authorities and informal justice systems through discrimination and lack of will to take effective action against abuses. A report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) states that they have recorded more cases of violence against women in the home in the past year as the security situation worsens. Their situation is further compounded by widespread, often dire, poverty limited access to healthcare, job and food insecurity, which further weakens their state.

Prevailing cultural attitudes and societal codes, invoked in the name of tradition and religion, are used as a justification for denying women the ability to enjoy their fundamental rights. Perceived transgressions of such codes have led to the imprisonment and even killing of some women. Such is the desperation to escape abusive situations such as forced marriage that 165 women committed suicide by self-immolation in 2007, according to AIHRC.

Both the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact have sought to strengthen the justice system, protect human rights and promote gender equality.¹ Despite this groundwork, however, Amnesty International is concerned at the inability of the Afghan government to ensure access to justice for women whose rights have been abused. The police, the courts and other justice sector officials seldom address women's complaints of violence, including rape and other sexual violence. Women victims and defendants have little recourse to justice and are discriminated against in both the formal and informal justice systems.

Amnesty International urges the Afghan government to take effective and immediate action to ensure that women's human rights are not relegated to the bottom of the political and development agenda. It must seek to build on its efforts to ensure that laws and policy are translated into action on the ground, so as to guarantee that the human rights of all Afghan women and girls are respected, protected and fulfilled.

The Afghan Government must also ensure that human rights defenders are able to play their vital role in documenting violations of human rights, in upholding international human rights standards and contributing to the development of society. If the rights of defenders are violated, then governments must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

Women human rights defenders often face a whole series of violations designed to silence them and paralyse their work. On International Women's Day, women defenders will once again speak out for human rights.

Public Document

****************************************

International Secretariat, Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 0DW, UK

www.amnesty.org

1 The Afghanistan National Development strategy outlines strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the government's development vision. An interim version (I-ANDS) was presented to the international community in January 2006. The Afghanistan Compact is a political agreement between the Afghan government and the international community to work together towards five-year benchmarks of progress across the three pillars of ANDs: 1) security, 2) governance, rule of law and human rights and 3) economic and social development.